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This report presents the “first findings” from the African Legislatures Project or 
ALP. The report is based on the preliminary coding and analysis of data 
obtained from research in six countries—Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, 
Namibia and South Africa (MP survey findings from South Africa are not 
presented as that element of the project is still in progress).  Because the purpose 
of ALP is to achieve a comparative understanding of legislative institutions 
across Africa, and is funded from multiple sources, we have adopted the practice 
of including data from as many countries as possible when we present findings 
from the project.  Field research for ALP began in late February 2008 and is 
expected to continue through the end of 2010 as the work proceeds seriatim in 
18 African countries.  Funds from DfID supported the field research in Kenya, 
Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia. We wish to thank DfID for this support. 
 
 
Data and approach 
 
ALP employs a comparative, quantitative, and multidimensional approach to 
understand the operations and development of African legislatures.  As such, the 
field research in each of the eighteen countries included in the project consists of 
four distinct modules: Module 1 consists of a codification of the formal rules 
that specify the role and powers of the legislature and the rules governing its 
internal operations. Module 2 consists of data on the composition of the 
legislature, a compendium of all bills introduced to the legislature over a five 
year period, an information sheet on the composition and performance of key 
parliamentary committees, plus additional information on the operations of the 
legislature obtained from interviews with key informants.   
 
Module 3 consists of data from questionnaire based interviews with a random 
sample of 50 members of the national legislature in each country. These 
interviews cover a wide range of topics including MP’s conceptions of their 
roles, the demands they face from their constituents and other key political 
actors, how they allocate their time, and the nature of their activities within the 
legislature. Module 4 ascertains public perceptions of the legislature and its 
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members via a sub-set of questions included in Round 4 of the Afrobarometer.  
Data from all four modules are coded on the basis of a common scheme to 
facilitate a comparative analysis of the study’s findings across the 18 countries. 
 
This report of first findings is divided into four sections that address the 
following topics: (1) The defining functions of democratic legislatures 
worldwide. (2) The role orientations and role expectations held by African MPs 
and citizens with respect to the defining functions of the legislature. (3) How 
MPs and the legislatures to which they belong approach the legislative process.  
(4) The nature of MPs’ engagement in constituency service and the burdens they 
incur.  A final section summarizes the principal findings from this analysis and 
their implications for those who seek to improve the quality of governance in 
selected developing countries. Those findings and recommendations can be 





1. As expected given the demographics and history of African countries, both 
citizens and MPs place a much higher emphasis on representation and 
constituency service than on legislating and oversight, two defining 
functions of the legislature. This poses a dilemma for MPs in most African 
legislatures—do they emphasize representation and constituency service 
with the result that the legislature of which they are members will not 
develop into a sufficiently powerful institution capable of holding the 
executive accountable to the public?  Or, do they devote more time to 
legislating and oversight at the risk of displeasing the electorate and 
suffering defeat when running for reelection? 
 
2. The form of electoral system via which a country selects its members of the 
legislature has a profound effect on the relationships between MPs and the 
public, the operations of the legislature, and the nature of legislative-
executive relations. The form of electoral system also appears to have a 
profound effect on the nature and structure of African political parties and 
the relationship of MPs to their parties. Put differently, there is much more 
at stake than simply translating votes into seats and whether that translation 
is “proportional.” 
 
3. The strength and internal cohesion of political parties and especially of the 
ruling party impacts greatly on the legislative process.  Further analysis, 
however, is required to fully understand the impact of political parties on 
the process of legislative development. 
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4. Notwithstanding the historical weakness of African legislature and the 
emphasis placed on representation and constituency service, it is clear that 
some of these legislatures have made significant progress in recent years 
and are asserting their role in the political process. Viable albeit 
undeveloped committee systems are emerging within some of these 
legislatures. Bills introduced by the executive for passage by the legislature 
are no longer “rubber stamped” but increasingly scrutinized and often 
amended before being passed into law. More extensive and effective 
oversight of the executive also appears to be emerging in some countries 
though an examination of this function was not included in this report.  
Though limited in some countries, the involvement of civil society in the 
legislative process, especially in countries with large urban sectors, is also 
on the rise. 
 
5. The amount of resources provided to both MPs and to the institution 
impacts on legislative performance.  In countries such as Kenya and South 
Africa where MPs salaries and travel allowances are high, and where 
legislative committees are better staffed, the frequency and quality of both 
committee service and constituency service is higher than in countries such 
as Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia where the legislature is relatively 
under resourced.  Put differently, the viability of the legislature with respect 
to the performance of its defining functions is impacted by the availability 
of resources for the legislature and its members.  This in turn begs the 
question of how and why sufficient resources are provided to the legislature 
in some countries but not in others. 
 
 
Implications for Legislative Strengthening 
 
 Given the provisional nature of these findings we are also tentative in 
suggesting what these findings imply for those who engage in legislative 
strengthening programs in selected countries. Some recommendations, however, 
flow from the summary above: 
 
1. More attention needs to be paid, both generally and in countries where 
donors have or are contemplating legislative strengthening programs, to the 
form of electoral system and its impact on the political process.  Electoral 
system design is generally an area neglected by the donor community or 
considered only when engaging in election support.  The choice of electoral 




2. Donor efforts devoted to strengthening the development of the committee 
system are well placed, especially where efforts are being made to establish 
an appropriate number of sectoral or portfolio committees that shadow 
MDAs.    
 
3. Donor efforts to support civil society should perhaps devote greater 
attention to raising civil society engagement with the legislature, 
particularly with those committees relevant for individual CSOs.   
 
4. Because resources count, and because some countries such as Kenya and 
South Africa have committed substantial resources to supporting the 
operations of their legislatures including travel support for MPs to their 
constituencies, donors should be careful when considering any provision of 
funds to support legislative operations. The sustainability of reforms that 
build capacity within the legislature and between the legislature and the 
public are, in the final analysis, dependent on the willingness by political 
elites to provide necessary resources.  Donors should therefore concentrate 
on sharing best practice via the provision of technical assistance to the 
extent that such assistance is requested by key leaders in the legislature, 
e.g. the Speaker, the Clerk, heads of party caucuses, etc. 
 
5. Above all else, donors must recognize that building capacity within 
emerging legislatures takes time. Today’s legislatures in Africa are very 
different from those of a decade or a decade and a half ago, but the changes 
observable within these bodies have been slow in emerging and did not 
occur overnight.  Building legislative capacity is also invariably a “messy” 
process that is part of a larger political process.  Donors seeking to build 
legislative capacity should do so only when and where they are committed 
to a sustained effort over a sustained period of time, and where they are 
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The Department for International Development (DfID) of the United Kingdom 
was instrumental in launching ALP by funding the research reported in this 
paper in Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. These were the first 
countries where field research was conducted for ALP.  We wish to thank DfID 
for its timely support.  Early funding by DfID has also enabled the project to 
secure complementary funding from the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID), the University of Cape Town, and the 
World Bank.
2
  Responsibility for the data and analysis reported in this paper, 
however, are those of the authors alone. ALP is based at the Centre for Social 
Science Research (CSSR) at the University of Cape Town.   
 
                                                 
1
 The countries included in ALP are 18 of the 20 countries included in Round 4 of the 
Afrobarometer: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   Cape Verde, Liberia and/or Sierra Leone (which is not yet included 
in the Afrobarometer) will be added to the project contingent on funding.  At the end of 2009, 
fieldwork had been completed in the six countries reported in this paper plus Ghana and 
Nigeria.   Research was continuing in Lesotho and South Africa.   ALP will commence field 
research in four additional countries during the first half of 2010—Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali 
and Senegal.   
2
 The Heinrich Böll Stiftung is funding the field research in Namibia and South Africa which 
will be completed by the end of November, 2009.  USAID is funding field research in 
Tanzania and Uganda which will be completed by the end of September, 2009.   The World 
Bank has provided ALP with a major grant that is funding research in Nigeria plus seven 
additional countries for a total of 16.  Research in the remaining two (perhaps four) countries 
to match the expanded number of Afrobarometer countries is planned for late 2010 or the first 
half of 2011. 
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Data and approach 
 
ALP employs a comparative, quantitative, and multidimensional approach to 
understand the operations and development of African legislatures.  As such, the 
field research in each of the eighteen countries included in the project consists of 
four distinct modules:  Module 1 consists of a codification of the formal rules 
that specify the role and powers of the legislature and the rules governing its 
internal operations. These include constitutions, standing orders, and other 
relevant documents. Module 2 consists of data on the composition of the 
legislature, a compendium of all bills introduced to the legislature over a five 
year period, an information sheet on the composition and performance of key 
parliamentary committees (e.g. standing orders, finance or budget, public 
accounts, agriculture, education and health), plus other information on the 
operations of the legislature obtained from interviews with key informants and 
staff. These include, but are not limited to the Clerk, the head of the 
parliamentary budget office where such exist, journalists reporting on the 
legislature, and civil society leaders.   
 
Module 3 which is arguably the most ambitious and difficult component of ALP, 
consists of data from questionnaire based interviews with a random sample of 50 
members of the national legislature in each country (57 in Nigeria).
3
 These 
interviews cover a wide range of topics including MP’s conceptions of their 
roles, the demands they face from their constituents and other key political 
actors, how they allocate their time, and the nature of their activities within the 
legislature.
4
  Module 4 ascertains public perceptions of the legislature and its 
members via a sub-set of questions included in Round 4 of the Afrobarometer to 
complement the data obtained in Modules 1 through 3.  Data from all four 
modules are coded on the basis of a common scheme to facilitate a comparative 
analysis of the study’s findings across the 18 countries.  This large and complex 
dataset will eventually be made available to other scholars and practitioners via 
SPSS (the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). 
 
This report of first findings is divided into four sections that address the 
following topics: (1) The defining functions of democratic legislatures 
worldwide. (2) The role orientations and role expectations held by African MPs 
and citizens with respect to the defining functions of the legislature. (3) How 
MPs and the legislatures to which they belong approach the legislative process.  
(4) MPs’ engagement in constituency service and the burdens they incur. We 
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 In countries with a bicameral legislature, interviews were confined to members of the lower 
house. 
4
 Interviews with MPs are quite lengthy and typically last between one and one and one half 
hours. 
3 
conclude with some tentative conclusions about the significance of our findings 
and their implications for those who seek to strengthen the legislative process to 
improve the quality of governance in selected countries. 
 
 
I. The Defining Functions of Democratic 
Legislatures 
 
ALP in Context 
 
The scholarly literature on African legislatures and on legislatures in emerging 
democracies generally, is limited to a small number of country case studies from 
which few general lessons have been drawn.  The policy literature is likewise 
limited consisting mainly of assessments of individual legislatures in preparation 
for donor programs to build up their capacity, or one-off evaluations of such 
programs.  The result is a limited knowledge of how and why legislatures have 
developed as institutions across Africa or why legislative development is weakly 
related to the larger process of democratization.  Donor knowledge of what 
constitutes best practice for strengthening the legislature is likewise limited.  
Only one comparative study of the legislative process and legislative 
development exists on Africa (Barkan 2009), but it too is based on a limited 
number of country case studies with the result that its principal conclusions 
remain hypotheses to be tested by further research.  This work has nevertheless 
informed ALP together with the extensive literature on the legislative process in 
established Western democracies as well as parallel research efforts in other 
“Third Wave” democratizers. 
 
This literature has led to a consensus among scholars and (to a lesser extent) 
among policy makers that legislatures are vital institutions for all democracies 
because they facilitate both vertical and horizontal accountability of the rulers to 
the ruled.  Indeed, as noted by Steven Fish, a leading student of legislative 
development in Eastern Europe, “stronger legislatures, stronger democracies” 
(Fish 2006).  Legislatures foster increased accountability, and thus “good 
governance” on the part of the executive branch when they develop into 
independent institutions of countervailing power.  They do so by performing a 
unique configuration of three core functions that are performed collectively 
inside the legislature:  Representation, legislating in the broad sense (i.e. 
making laws that set forth government policy), and oversight or monitoring of 
the executive branch.  Depending on the nature of the society and its system of 
electoral representation, legislators—acting individually and largely outside the 
legislature rather than as members of a collective body—also perform a fourth 
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function, that of constituency service.  This is particularly true where members 
of the legislature (e.g. MPs) are elected from single member districts or small 
multimember districts rather than by proportional representation (PR) from 
districts with many members, i.e. districts with high district magnitude.  How 
and whether MPs perform all three of the core collective functions of the 
legislature tells us much about the performance of specific legislatures and how 
much power they wield.  Such knowledge also provides a guide to organizations 
seeking to enhance the legislature’s capacity to perform these functions. 
 
If the three functions of representation, legislating and oversight define what 
legislatures do, another defining attribute of all legislatures is that the three core 
functions plus constituency service exist in tension with each other.  
Representation, arguably the first function of all legislatures, requires that MPs 
“re-present” the expectations and demands of their constituents or party.  By 
contrast, legislating requires members to negotiate and bargain amongst the 
competing interests they represent to craft legislation that can be passed by the 
chamber as a whole.  The core functions exist in tension both functionally and in 
real time by competing for the time and resources individual members devote to 
each.  It is, to a large extent, a zero-sum game.  Time spent on representation 
and constituency service means less time available to spend on legislating or 
oversight.  Time spent on oversight to ensure accountability means less time 
available to spend on legislating.    
 
 
Why Most African Legislatures are Weak 
Legislatures 
 
Most African legislatures have been historically weak institutions because of a 
combination of factors that are a major disincentive for members to perform the 
three core and collective functions of the legislature. This particular 
configuration of factors is unique to sub-Saharan Africa though components of it 
are found elsewhere. It consists of two principal elements. (1) Africa’s 
demographics particularly the fact that most African societies are poor, agrarian, 
plural, and unevenly developed societies.  (2) The colonial legacy, especially the 
formal rules (e.g. constitutions, standing orders) that established the basis for 
today’s legislatures in the run-up to independence. This legacy imposed the 
following constraints on the legislature and include (i) limited constitutional 
powers for the legislature especially with respect to the budgetary process; (ii) 
poorly resourced legislatures including low salaries for members, limited 
physical infrastructure, and few professional staff to support members in their 
work; (iii) limited provisions for a system of parliamentary committees, 
especially “sectoral” or “portfolio” committees that shadow ministries, 
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departments and agencies (MDAs) of the executive branch and whose members 
and staff develop specialized expertise over time; (iv) the election MPs from 
single member districts or small multi-member districts rather than by  
proportional representation (PR) from large multi-member districts. 
 
The interaction between Africa’s demographic conditions and the circumstances 
surrounding the establishment of the legislature across the continent created a 
structure of incentives and disincentives that led MPs to emphasize constituency 
service and neglect performance of the three core functions.  On the one hand, 
MPs (and backbenchers in particular) had few opportunities to shape legislation 
or involve themselves in oversight of the executive. On the other, MPs who 
were elected mainly from rural constituencies by electorates that expected them 
to bring “pork barrel” type resources back to their communities or address their 
individual needs. The basis for electoral politics was and remains decidedly 
local which meant that citizen expectations of the legislature did not emphasize 
MP performance as legislators or overseers of the executive, but as deliverers of 
public goods back to the constituency (e.g. schools, health clinics, water 
supplies, roads). This in turn became the basis for clientelist politics and 
eventually for the emergence of neo-patrimonial, i.e. “Big Man” regimes.     
 
The emergence of clientelist politics also meant that African political parties 
were (and remain) weak organizations that rarely distinguished themselves on 
the basis of policy or program. Nor, therefore, were they disciplined 
organizations that shaped the legislative process within the legislature. As 
African nationalism morphed into neo-patrimonial rule during the 1970s and 
1980s, African presidents purposely starved the legislature and its members of 
resources to ensure their dependence on (and thus their compliance with) the 
executive.   
 
Notwithstanding this general pattern, there are significant differences between 
African legislatures in their performance of the three core functions as well as 
differences between individual MPs in their performance of constituency 
service.  These differences did not emerge until after the return to multiparty 
politics in the early 1990s or, in the case of Namibia and South Africa, until 
after their transitions from minority to majority rule.  These variations are often 
a direct result of deliberate changes made by the members of some legislatures 
to the formal rules that specify the extent of legislative power, as well as 
differences in the amount and type of resources provided to the legislature.  The 
extent of such changes and resources has accelerated since 2000, that is to say, 
after the second or third multiparty election.  Differences in the type of electoral 
system used to elect the legislature also shape the extent to which different 
legislatures perform the core functions that define these bodies.   
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II. Role Orientations 
 
We begin this presentation of “first findings” with an analysis of the role 
expectations that citizens and legislators hold about what are the most important 
aspects of the MP’s job. We then discuss these in respect to the defining 
functions of legislatures and what these role expectations suggest for the process 
of legislative performance and development. 
 
 
How Citizens Define the Job of MPs 
 
The public’s role expectations for MPs are presented in Figure 1 and are 
consistent with what one would expect from the six countries through with some 
interesting variations.  Three main findings are suggested by the data:  First, that 
in respect to the core functions of the legislature, citizens in all six countries 
express a strong preference that MPs should focus first on the needs of the 
constituencies that elect them to office—either by representing their views 
within the legislature or by engaging in constituency service.  By contrast, 
citizens have much lower expectations that MPs should engage in the two other 
defining functions of legislatures—legislating and overseeing the operations of 
the executive branch.  Indeed, citizen appreciation of the value of legislative 
oversight is particularly low suggesting that for most citizens, oversight is a very 
distant and abstract activity that has little meaning for their lives.   
 
Second, yet contrary to the conventional wisdom of the primacy of constituency 
service, Africans emphasize the ability of MPs to represent their opinions 
upward and within the legislature and government generally.
5
  Particularly 
surprising is the finding that representation is regarded as more important than 
constituency service in those countries that elect MPs from single member 
districts (SMDs) rather than by proportional representation (PR).
6
  Conversely, 
citizens in countries that use PR place a greater emphasis on constituency 
service than on representation, perhaps because there are no geographically 
defined constituencies for MPs to service in this context.   Whether this means 
that citizens in PR countries are dissatisfied with the extent to which the 
legislature is responding to their needs is unclear.  It is also unclear whether the 
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 Whether they view representation as closely related to constituency service—that obtaining 
state resources to bring back to the constituency is achieved at the center—is hard to 
determine from our data. 
6
 Of the six countries considered in this report, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia elect MPs from 
SMDs while South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique elect their representatives via PR using 
closed party lists. 
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respondents in all six countries view representation and constituency service as 
two sides of the same coin—the upward and the downward dimensions of the 
process of making the state accountable to the governed—but our findings 
suggest this possibility.  If so, the finding that citizens in countries that elect 
their MPs from single member districts emphasize representation more than 
constituency service while the reverse is true for countries using PR further 
suggests that citizens within each group are calling for their MPs to address the 
dimension of the state-society relationship that is discouraged by the type of 
electoral system used in their country. 
 
Figure 1: Public Expectations:



































Constituency Service Representation Law Making Oversight
Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia Mozambique
Representatives to the National Assembly have different responsibilities.  Which the following do you think is the 
most important responsibility of your representative to the National Assembly: Listening to Constituents and 
represent their needs?  Deliver jobs or development to your constituency? Make laws for the good of the country? 
Monitor the President and his government? 
 
Third, the type of electoral system shapes citizen expectations about how MPs 
should perform their jobs, but highlights the historic dilemma of electoral 
system design for agrarian and plural societies including those in Africa.  
Should electoral systems be inclusive and faithfully translate the proportion of 
the vote received by each political party into a similar percentage of seats?  Or, 
should the method of translating votes into seats be tied to geographic areas at 
the risk of yielding disproportional results?  The problem with the first, is that 
because PR systems do not seek to represent constituencies that are 
geographically defined, only a tiny proportion of citizens in countries that 
employ PR have any direct (i.e. face to face) contact with members of the 
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national legislature (Mattes 2002).  Legislators in PR systems rarely travel out 
into the rural areas to meet members of the public, but do spend more time 
legislating and on oversight than their counterparts in countries that elect MPs 
from small geographic constituencies.    
 
The problem for countries that elect the legislature from small geographic 
constituencies is just the opposite. Citizens in these countries (e.g. Kenya, 
Malawi, and Zambia) place so much emphasis on constituency service and 
representation, that MPs devote little time to legislating and oversight.  Indeed, 
the more time spent on these functions the lower their prospects for reelection.  
These tendencies also undermine the development of the legislature into an 
independent branch of government that limits executive power and holds the 
executive accountable to the public (Barkan 2009). 
 
The results in Figure 1 illustrate this dilemma. Whereas the combined 
percentage of citizens in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia, who state that the most 
important job for an MP is to engage in representation or constituency service 
ranges from 87 to 92 percent, the percentage in Mozambique, Namibia and 
South Africa is much less—from 53 to 68 percent.  Conversely, the combined 
percentage of citizens in Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa who state that 
the most important job of MPs are to legislate or exercise oversight of the 
executive ranges from 22 to 35 percent while citizens in Kenya, Malawi and 
Zambia the range is much lower, from only 7 to 12 percent.  Appreciation of 
two of the most important and defining functions of the legislature is particularly 
low in countries that elect the legislature from single member districts.  
 
 
How MPs Define Their Job for Themselves 
   
Turning to how MPs consider these same functions, the results are consistent 
with citizen preferences but with some important variations.  As shown in 
Figure 2, legislators in all five countries state that constituency service is the 
most important aspect of their job (South Africa results are not displayed 
because MP surveys are still in progress in that country).  Most important but 
not surprising, MPs put a much greater emphasis than citizens on law making 
and oversight. With the exception of Zambian MPs, the legislators in our 
samples regard law making as the second most important aspect of their job.    
 
The impact of the electoral system also appears to have less impact on MPs than 
on citizens.  While the emphasis on constituency service is greatest in countries 
that elect MPs from geographic constituencies, it is not pronounced.  
Conversely, MPs in countries that use PR do not place greater emphasis on law 
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making than do their counterparts elected from geographic constituencies 
though the impact of electoral system design is clearly seen with respect to 
oversight. 
 
Figure 2: MP Role Orientations:






























Constituency Service Representation Law Making Oversight
Kenya Malawi Zambia Namibia Mozambique
In your opinion, which of these following jobs is the most important part of being an MP? 
Sources of Job Satisfaction for MPs 
 
Notwithstanding how MPs define their official roles—what they believe they 
should do, constituency service is the most satisfying aspect of their jobs.  The 
finding, presented in Figure 3, is present in all five countries for which data was 
available.  Clearly African MPs gain great pleasure from “taking care” of their 
constituents.  This should come as no surprise in countries where the dispensing 
of patronage and services has long been the basis of successful political careers.  
Indeed, this view no doubt reinforces such tendencies as much as it is driven by 
them.   
 
The findings in Figure 3 are also disturbing, because they suggest that 
legislating and oversight; the two defining functions of the legislature that MPs 
perform on a collective basis are not regarded as particularly rewarding by 
most members of the institution. But if this is true, and if the finding is replicated 
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in the remaining 13 countries included in ALP, then the prospects for the 
development of the legislature across Africa seem limited.  Several reasons 
explain this finding.  First, as noted at the outset of this report, African MPs 
have historically been under great pressure to respond to the needs of rural 
communities while at the same time deprived of resources, indeed actively 
discouraged, to engage in legislating in the broad sense and oversight.  There 
has been no tradition of legislating.  Second, as in the legislatures of established 
democracies, legislating can be a messy and contentious process, or one 
determined mainly by the executive branch. This is particularly true in 
parliamentary systems.  For African MPs, the emergence of the legislature into 
an institution that fully performs the legislative and oversight functions is a long 
and steep climb, and one that will take many years.  The implications of this 
finding for DfID and other donors seeking to strengthen legislative performance, 
should be clear; namely that it is a long term exercise that one only engages if 
one is to prepared to commit resources for at least a decade, perhaps more. 
 
Figure 3: MP Role Orientations:






























Constituency Service Representation Law Making Oversight
Kenya Malawi Zambia Mozambique Namibia





How MPs Allocate Their Time 
 
Turning lastly to how MPs actually spend their time, Figure 4 indicates the 
average percentage of time the MPs interviewed in each country devote to five 
basic tasks.  The results, which are consistent with those presented above in 
Figures 1 through 3, indicate that constituency work is the single greatest 
claimant on MP’s time in all countries except Mozambique.  The impact of 
electoral system design is again clear in Namibia and Mozambique.  
Notwithstanding the time they spend on constituency work, the time MPs spend 
working on tasks performed within the legislature in these countries is 
substantially greater than the time spent by MPs in countries where members are 
elected from single member districts. MPs from countries that elect members via 
PR are also more likely to engage in party work though the tendency is not as 
pronounced in Namibia as in Mozambique.   
































Constituency Work Committe Work Plenary Work Party Work Other Work
Kenya Malawi Zambia Namibia Mozambique
What percentage of your time is devoted to each of the following? 
The significant amount of time MPs in Mozambique and Namibia devote to 
party, however, is not explained by PR alone.  Political parties in these countries 
have historically been much stronger organizations than political parties 
elsewhere in Africa in terms of their ability to mobilize the public behind their 
goals.  Parties in Southern Africa have likewise been more effective at 
articulating a clear set of philosophical and programmatic goals. 
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III. The Legislative Process 
 
Although African publics and MPs emphasize the importance of constituency 
service, it is essential to consider how the latter approach their work within the 
legislature to understand how and why the institution functions as it does.  We 
first consider some dimensions of MPs’ involvement in the legislative process 
generally including how they resolve the various cross pressures that they are 
under, and then turn to an examination of the nature of their involvement in 
committee work because as noted above it is essence of the modern legislature. 
 
It is useful to begin with a review of Figure 2 (page 9), because it reminds the 
reader that “law making” is the second most important function identified by 
MPs in four of the six countries for which data is available.  While MPs place 
great emphasis on constituency service, because it gives them great satisfaction 
and their careers depend on it, they nonetheless recognize the importance of law 
making, especially in South Africa and Mozambique.    
 
 
Legislative Assertiveness in the Law-Making 
Process 
 
One sign of the historical weakness of African legislatures, and indeed weak 
legislatures elsewhere, is the limited number of days and hours that they are in 
session per year. No legislature, including legislatures in established 
democracies are in session continuously, and most limit the days they are in 
session to the middle of the week so that members can spend time in their 
constituencies on weekends.  Most legislatures also limit the number of plenary 
sessions to provide meeting time for legislative committees which are arguably 
the most important deliberative forum of the modern legislature.  As indicated in 
Table 1, the legislatures in three of the countries for which we currently have 
data are in session from between 9 and 21 hours per week, or roughly one to 
three full days.  While Mozambique is definitely on the “low side” in terms of 
providing its legislature sufficient time in plenary to conduct much business, 
Malawi and Zambia are not.  Further discussion of the legislative calendar will 
follow in subsequent reports after the ALP research team has coded the relevant 
data for more countries included in the study.  In the meantime we present this 
initial finding to provide readers with a rough sense of the extent to which the 
legislature is “open for business.” 
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Table 1: Legislative Activity:
Scheduled Time In Session and In Plenary*
Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia Mozambique
Hours Per 
Year
N/A 357 316 N/A N/A 180
Hours Per 
Week
N/A 21 19.8 N/A N/A 9
Sessions 
Per Year




N/A 17 16 N/A 26 20
* Average over past five years
A second area of legislative assertiveness in the law-making process is the 
number, source and type of legislative bills introduced and passed by the 
legislature annually. Although all bills are not of equal importance, the best 
measure of a legislature’s capacity and power to legislate is its ability to 
deliberate, amend and pass bills into law.
7
  As indicated by Figure 5, the number 
of bills introduced and passed by the six legislatures considered in this study is 
low to modest except in South Africa where the level of legislative business 
appears to be nearly double that in the other five. It is particularly low in 
Mozambique where the legislature is in session for the shortest period annually.  
Here again additional data is required from the other countries included in ALP 
and also from a select number of established democracies to accurately interpret 
these findings in their broader context.  The same is true when understanding the 
proportion of bills introduced that are passed into law. Does the fact that 
legislature passes a very high percentage of bills introduced -- as is the case in 
South Africa and Namibia -- reflect the fact that both countries elect their 
legislature via closed list PR, a practice that places tremendous power with the 
leadership of all parties, or that the ruling parties in both countries hold large 
parliamentary majorities? By contrast, in Kenya and Malawi (but not in 
Zambia), two countries where the party system is more fragmented and where 
the legislature is elected from single member districts, the legislature appears to 
be more independent by passing only half to two-thirds of legislation introduced.   
                                                 
7
 In making this statement, we are mindful of the fact that “rubber stamp” legislatures, 
especially in the context of authoritarian political systems, often pass many bills.  However, 
few such legislatures do so after deliberating the merits and shortcomings of proposed 
legislation.   Nor do rubber stamp legislatures amend pending legislation. 
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Figure 5: Legislative Activity: 
















Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia Mozambique**
Introduced Passed
*   Average over past five years
** 2003-2004  
 
The continued dominance of the executive as the source of legislation is 
apparent in five of the countries for which we can report data on this question.  
As indicated in Figure 6, the data confirm the long historical experience of 
executive dominance in Africa where private members’ bills were all but 
suppressed until recent years. The emergence of a significant minority of private 
members’ bills in Kenya where nearly a quarter of current legislation is now 
introduced from the back bench is indicative of other efforts by reformist 
parliamentarians in that country to assert the independence of the National 
Assembly from the executive branch. Indeed, the proportion of private 
members’ bills may increase as the Parliamentary Service Commission in Kenya 
hired its own legal draftsperson to facilitate the introduction of bills by 
individual members in 2009.
8
 
                                                 
8
 Previously, as in nearly all other African countries, individual members were dependent on 
the Attorney General’s Office for drafting expertise, a situation which resulted in few if any 
such bills being officially introduced. 
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Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia
Total Executive Non Executive
* Average over past five years
 
Turning to the type of legislation introduced in the legislature, the mix of 
legislation appears again to be shaped by type of electoral system and the extent 
of ruling party dominance. Figure 7 suggests that the proportion of bills 
introduced that address sectoral policy issues is higher in countries where the 
ruling party has the greatest control over its own MPs than in countries where 
MPs are elected from single member districts (SMDs). This in turn suggests that 
the executive in SMD countries must devote a higher proportion of its time 
focusing on the passage of financial bills to keep government running than in 
countries that use closed list PR. It would also appear that countries that use 
closed-list PR spend less time on “other” legislation including constitutional 
amendments and treaties than countries that elect their members from SMDs.  
This is not surprising given the higher probability of party discipline in these 
countries. However, further analysis is required to confirm the presence and 
reasons behind this relationship. 
 
A significant portion of the legislation introduced by the executive in all 
countries is not “new” initiatives, but amendments to or the repeal of existing 
legislation. Except in Kenya, roughly half of all legislation introduced in the 
other countries considered in this report is addressed to existing legislation.  The 
higher percentage of bills introduced (71 per cent) that were classified as “new” 
legislation in Kenya may be another indication of the rising independence of the 
Kenya National Assembly.  As discussed above, the number of private members 
bills in Kenya is higher than elsewhere, and reflects the belief held by some 
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Kenyan MPs that their proper role is to propose new legislation addressed to the 
problems facing their country.  The fact that Kenya does not use PR may also be 
a factor as backbenchers have more latitude to propose legislation than in 
countries that use PR. 
Figure 7: Focus of Legislation Introduced*





















Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia
Total Other Financial Sectoral
* Average over past five years




















Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia




To summarize, just as the choice of electoral system clearly shapes both public 
and MPs’ role expectations of which functions to emphasize in the carrying out 
of one’s legislative duties, so too does the choice of electoral system appear to 
influence the extent of legislative independence from the executive branch as 
well as the mix of legislation considered by the legislature. The extent of the 
extent of ruling party dominance is also a clearly factor.  
 
 
Influences on the Positions MPs Take on Issues in 
the Legislature 
 
MPs are subject to a multiplicity of cross-pressures with respect to the positions 
they take within the legislature. Figure 9 indicates four different sources of such 
pressure including their own personal views.  Once again the impact of electoral 
system is evident though it would appear that other factors, most likely the 
extent of urbanization, are also at play. As expected, constituents’ views are 
considered particularly important in Kenya and Malawi where MPs are elected 
from single member districts, but somewhat less so in Zambia, a country of high 
urbanization. Notwithstanding this variation, MPs in the three countries that 
elect the legislature from single member districts are more likely to cite the 
views of their constituents than MPs from the three countries that utilize closed 
list PR. The impact of electoral system, however, is ambiguous with respect to 
party and “the national interest.” The most consistent finding presented in Figure 
9 is that personal views do not count for much amongst African MPs regardless 
of the electoral system that brought them to office.  Further analysis is clearly 
required to better understand why MPs respond to these different influences as 
they do. Moreover, this analysis does not compare different types of MPs within 
each country, e.g. those from rural vs. those from urban areas; those from the 
ruling party vs. those from the opposition. ALP will address these dimensions in 
greater detail and rigor as additional data is obtained from other countries, and a 
multivariate analysis is undertaken.   
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Constituency Party National Interest Personal
Kenya Malawi Zambia Namibia Mozambique
In general, when you take a position about an issue in the [legislature], which of the following is 
most important:  Views of your party / party leaders? Views of your constituents?  The national 
interest?   Your knowledge about the issue?  Your personal convictions?
Figure 10: Public Preferences on Cross-Pressures:













Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia Mozamique
Agree Strongly Agree
Which of the following statements is closest to your view?  A.  Our elected officials should 
listen to constituents’ views and do what they demand?   B.  Our elected leaders should 
follow their own ideas in deciding what is best for the country?
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In the meantime, Figure 10 examines the issue of cross-pressures by asking 
citizens whether MPs should listen to their constituents or follow their own 
views and convictions. The data is from Round 3 of the Afrobarometer. By large 
margins—between 60 and 95 percent—the respondents in all six countries 
believe that MPs should follow the views of their constituents rather than their 
own, a finding consistent with the data presented in Figure 9.  The impact of 
electoral system, however, is also clear.  Not surprisingly, this view is more 
pronounced in countries that elect members of the legislature from single 
member districts (82 to 95 percent) than in countries that use PR and where the 
influence of party looms large (60 to 75 percent).  
 
The impact of the electoral system is again pronounced when MPs must choose 
between the position of their party vs. the views of their constituents.  As shown 
in Figure 11, MPs in Mozambique are far more likely to support the position of 
their party than MPs in Kenya Malawi and Zambia. Conversely, Kenyan MPs, 
and to a lesser extent those in Malawi and Zambia are more likely to oppose the 
position of their party.  
 
Figure 11: Resolving Cross-Pressures:























Support Your Party Oppose Your Party Abstain / Stay Home
Kenya Malawi Zambia Mozambique
What should MPs do if there is a conflict between their political party’s position and the 






Committee Involvement in the Legislative Process 
 
If there is one universally accepted principle of “best practice” that applies to all 
modern democratic legislatures, it is that a well developed system of 
parliamentary committees that shadows government ministries, departments and 
agencies (MDAs) is essential for the legislature to perform its defining 
functions, especially legislating and oversight. Well developed and effective 
committee systems share at least three attributes. First, there exists a sufficient 
number of departmental or portfolio committees to facilitate a useful division of 
labor and specialization amongst MPs and parliamentary staff to permit both to 
fully understand the policy issues for which their respective committees are 
responsible. An appropriate number of departmental committees are also 
required to effectively scrutinize the operations of all MDAs. Second, 
irrespective of the number of departmental committees, a committee system 
cannot deliberate or amend legislation or scrutinize MDAs unless each 
committee and especially key committees such as finance, agriculture, 
education, health and defense are led and populated by MPs motivated to spend 
time on committee work, and who understand the subject matter with which 
their committee is concerned.  Third, to be effective a system of departmental 
committees must be supported by trained and specialized staff and be provided 
with some minimum level of resources in terms of meeting space and funds to 
conduct its business. All three of these attributes have been the focus of 
discussion across Africa in recent years as reformist MPs in a selected number 
of legislatures have sought to enhance the capacity of their institutions to 
effectively perform the defining functions of the legislature. 
 
We begin this short analysis of committee involvement in the legislative process 
by comparing the average annual number of bills introduced to the legislature 
with the average annual number reviewed by one or more parliamentary 
committees.  As indicated in Figure 12, there is a wide variation across five of 
the six countries for which data is available.  Whereas in Namibia, slightly more 
than 5 percent of legislation was reviewed by a legislative committee, in Zambia 
it was nearly 88 percent and in South Africa all proposed legislation was 
reviewed by an appropriate committee.  In Kenya it was 59 percent.     
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Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia Mozambique**
 Introduced Comt Reviewed
* Average over past five years
Further analysis is required to explain this variation, but two clusters of 
variables are likely to be the most important: (1) The personal attributes of MPs 
including their education and motivation. (2)  The amount of resources available 
to the legislature to support the work of the committee system.  With respect to 
the first, Figure 13 presents MPs’ estimates of the capacity of their fellow 
members to understand the legislation considered by the committees on which 
they served. There is a considerable variation across the six countries both in the 
percentage who thought MPs’ capacity was merely “good” and/or “very good.” 
Whereas only 38 percent of Mozambican MPs regarded the capacity of their 
fellow MPs as “good” or “very good,” the figure in Kenya was 85 percent.   
Sixty-four percent of South African MPs rated their colleagues in these 
categories while the percentages of MPs in the other three countries were lower.  
The high rankings given by Kenya and South African MPs no doubt reflects the 
higher levels of education amongst MPs in those countries, especially Kenya 
where 95 percent of the MPs in the 9
th
 Parliament had received post-secondary 
education and 21 per cent had received post-graduate degrees.    
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Figure 13: MPs’ Perceptions of












Kenya Malawi Zambia Namibia Mozambique South Africa
Very good Good
Thinking of the committees on which you serve,  how would you rate the typical members’ 
understanding of the legislation and policy issues they consider?
 
The large percentage of highly educated MPs also explains why 30 percent of 
Kenyan MPs were estimated to have a “very good” grasp of pending legislation 
whereas in Zambia the percentage was 12. The educational background of the 
Zambian legislatures is more heterogeneous than Kenya—while there is a core 
group of members with high educational qualifications, the educational 
backgrounds of many backbenchers are much lower. 
Figure 14: MPs’ Perceptions of












Kenya Malawi Zambia Namibia Mozambique South Africa
All Most
Do Committee Clerks have the skills required for the committee they work for?   
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Figure 14 presents MPs’ assessments of the capacity of the clerks assigned to 
parliamentary committees. Once again, there is considerable variation from the 
very low rating for committee clerks in Namibia to the high rating accorded 
committee clerks in Zambia. 
 
Another important dimension of the committee system is its interaction with 
civil society.  Do committees operate in isolation of the public? Or do they seek 
submissions of input and/or provide access to organizations that purport to 
represent the interests of selected segments of the public? Our findings, which 
appear in Figure 15 for five of the six countries, present a very mixed picture.  
By far the highest involvement of civil society in committee work is in South 
Africa followed by Zambia and Kenya. The finding is direct reflection of the 
extent of urbanization—highest in South Africa and Zambia where over 50 
percent of the population resides in the urban areas and then by Kenya where the 
percentage urban dwellers is roughly  35 to 40 percent.  Civil society in Africa is 
basically an urban phenomenon, especially those organizations that become 
engaged in the political process by lobbying both the executive and the 
legislature, to advance their views. Civil society contact with the legislature has 
historically been low relative to its engagement with the executive branch, but 
the level of engagement is rising as the legislature emerges as a more significant 
institution in some African countries. That is particularly true in South Africa 
and Kenya. Although the South African National Assembly remains very much 
under the control of the leadership of the ruling African National Congress, the 
fact that the committee system scrutinizes all legislation suggests why civil 
society engages the committee system over roughly half of all legislation.  Put 
simply, because the committees have become a significant arena for the 
deliberation and amendment of legislation, civil society is going where “the 
action” is. The same pattern appears to be emerging in Kenya and Zambia. 
 
Civil society engagement is no doubt also rising. In marked contrast to the pre-
democratic era, African legislatures have taken steps, albeit to varying degrees 
to facilitate civil society’s input at the committee stage. Civil society 
organizations, especially in South Africa, Kenya and Zambia have also 
demanded such. It is therefore not surprising that MPs in all five countries 
estimated that civil society’s access to hearings was “easy” or “very easy” as 
indicated in Figure 16. Similar percentages of MPs in each country except 
Kenya indicated that it was “easy” or “very easy” for civil society organizations 
to make formal submissions to parliamentary committees.
9
  We would, however, 
expect that MP assessment of the welcome their legislatures extend to civil 
                                                 
9
 Data on this relationship is not presented here given space limitations.  The combined 
percentage of Kenyan MPs who estimated that it was “easy” or “very easy” for civil society 
organizations to make submissions was 55 percent. 
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society organizations is somewhat higher than what civil society leaders would 
ascribe to the process. Unfortunately, ALP did not question civil society leaders 
re how they assessed their relationship with the legislature generally and the 
committee system in particular. 
 
Figure 15: Civil Society Involvement During





















Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia
 Introduced Comt Reviewed With Civil Society Input
  
The overall picture presented in Figures 15 and 16 is that while civil society has 
access to legislative committees in all six countries, it only takes advantage of 
that access at a modest level in Kenya and Zambia.  It is probably for this reason 
that MPs’ estimate of the quality of committee-civil society engagement is more 
modest as indicated in Figure 17. However, the high rankings accorded the 
relationship by MPs in Malawi, Namibia and Mozambique is somewhat 
puzzling given that few bills are amended with civil society input in those 
countries. Unfortunately, no data assessing the relationship in Zambia is 
available at this time. 
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Figure 16: MPs’ Perceptions of












Kenya Malawi Zambia Namibia Mozambique South Africa
Very easy Easy
Thinking of the committees on which you serve, how difficult or easy is it  for civil society 
organizations to gain access to committee hearings?
Figure 17: MPs’ Perceptions of 












Kenya Malawi Zambia Namibia Mozambique South Africa
Very Good Good
Thinking of the committees on which you serve, how would you rate the quality of your 
committee’s interactions with civil society organizations?  
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We conclude this discussion of the emerging systems of legislative committees 
by considering MPs’ perception of the changes in committee effectiveness.  
These assessments, presented in Figure 18,
10
 are quite positive, especially in 
Kenya, Namibia and Mozambique where between 70 and 90 percent of the MPs 
indicated that committee effectiveness had “increased” or “increased” a great 
deal.  Surprisingly, the ratings were much lower in South Africa notwithstanding 
the fact that it is arguably the best resourced legislature in Africa.  One possible 
explanation for these variations in assessment is whether or not the legislature 
received technical assistance from one or more international aid agencies to 
build the capacity of the committee system.  The National Assemblies in both 
Kenya and Namibia, for example received such assistance during the preceding 
decade. Another, potential explanation is the quality of committee chairs and 
members. While at least a third of the committees in the South African National 
Assembly are regarded as having very good to excellent chairs, it is also 
acknowledged that the overall membership of most committees is mediocre 
given the presence of many MPs of the ruling party whose educational 
backgrounds are significantly lower than the chairs of the committees to which 
they belong.  Further analysis is clearly required to properly interpret the data 
reported in this section.  
Figure 18: MPs’ Perceptions of 












Kenya Malawi Namibia Mozambique South Africa
Increased (Great Deal) Increased
Do Committee Clerks have the skills required for the committee they work for?   (N.B.  Not 
Asked in Zambia)  
                                                 
10
 Please disregard the legend at the bottom of Figure 18 which was inserted in error except 
the notation that no data is available for Zambia at this time. 
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Legislative Assertiveness—A Second Look 
 
We conclude this discussion of the legislative process by presenting a summary 
of the disposal of legislation in five of the six legislatures discussed in this 
report. Figure 19 presents the full summary of the legislative process from 
introduction through passage including whether the legislation was amended in 
committee or in plenary session. The numbers over each bar are the average 
annual number of bills over the last five years.  Having already considered the 
extent to which bills are scrutinized by departmental committees (see Fig 12, 
page 19) our focus here is on the extent to which bills are amended.  The first 
finding presented in the Figure that merits comment is that while bills are rarely 
if ever amended by committees in Zambia and Namibia, a substantial number 
are amended in plenary. This begs the question of what drives the amendment 
process in the two countries. While it may be a committee recommendation in 
Zambia where a very high proportion of legislation is reviewed by committees, 
it is not true in Namibia where committees rarely scrutinize legislation.    
 
The bottom line, however, is that 56 per cent of the bills introduced in the Kenya 
National Assembly are amended at either the committee or plenary stage; 17 per 
cent of those introduced in Malawi are amended; 49 per cent in Zambia; 62 per 
cent in South Africa; and 44 per cent in Namibia.
11
  The percentages are even 
higher when calculated as the number of bills amended as a percentage of those 
actually passed—115 per cent in Kenya,
12
 27 per cent in Malawi, 50 per cent in 
Zambia, 70 per cent in South Africa and 44 per cent in Namibia.  By either 
measure the picture suggests a significant to moderately high level of legislative 
assertiveness in four of the five legislatures considered in Figure 19.  Indeed, 
compared to the era of one-party rule and the period before the end of Apartheid 
in the early 1990s, these legislatures have made real progress in emerging as 
independent institutions vis-à-vis the executive.  While there is much work to do 
in terms of building capacity amongst these legislatures, they are very different 
institutions than they were a mere decade and a half ago. The extent of 
legislative independence is particularly striking in Kenya and South Africa 
though for very different reasons. In Kenya, the extent of parliamentary 
independence suggested by this data marks the culmination of a decade-long 
effort by reformist MPs to assert the independence of their institution vis-à-vis 
                                                 
11
 These percentages were computed by first adding together the number of bills amended in 
committee and plenary and dividing the total by the number of bills introduced. 
 
12
 The percentage of bills passed that were amended in Kenya exceeds 100 because the 
number of bills amended is the total of all those introduced rather than bills actually passed 
into law.  In other words, the number of bills amended includes some that did not pass the 
third reading in the National Assembly, or were not assented to by the President of Kenya. 
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the executive.  By contrast in South Africa, where the ruling ANC holds two-
thirds of the seats in the National Assembly, the high percentage of bills 
amended at the committee (but not the plenary stage) is indication of an 
emerging committee system notwithstanding the rather modest marks South 
African MPs give to committees when assessing their effectiveness (Barkan 
2009). 






























Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia
 Introduced Comt Reviewed Passed Amended in Committee Amended in Plenary
 
IV. Constituency Service 
 
We close this report of “first findings” from ALP with an examination of the 
activity that MPs regard as the most important aspect of their job (Figure 2, page 
9) and which gives them the greatest satisfaction (Figure 3, page 10) in five of 
the six countries considered—constituency service.  Constituency service is also 
the activity to which MPs allocate the greatest percentage of their time in four of 
the six countries (Figure 4, page 11).
13
 We begin in with a comparison in Figure 
20 between the level of citizen demand for MPs to be present in their 
constituencies and their assessment of MPs’ actual presence as reported in 
Round 4 of the Afrobarometer.    
                                                 
13
 Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia 
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Figure 20:  Citizens’ Perceptions of MP 













Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia Mozambique
Almost all of their time At least weekly At least once a month
How much time should your representative to the National Assembly spend in this constituency to visit the 
community and its citizens? 
How much of the time does your representative to the National Assembly spend in this constituency to visit 
the community and its citizens?  
 
After all, constituency service is unlikely if MPs do not visit their constituencies 
on a regular basis.
14
 Not surprisingly, the demand for MP presence in the 
constituency is greatest in countries that elect the legislature from single 
member districts. Indeed, more than 90 per cent of respondents in Kenya, 
Malawi and Zambia expect their MPs to visit his or her constituency at least 
once a month. The percentage ranges from 45 and 68 per cent in countries that 
elect the legislature via PR—more modest, but still significant. The contrast 
with citizen reports of the actual presence of MPs in their constituencies is thus 
striking and suggests why so many incumbents in countries using SMDs are 
defeated when they run for reelection.  The gap between “supply” and “demand” 
for MP presence also makes clear why MPs spend so much time on constituency 
service, and why they are in a bind when it comes to choosing between servicing 
the constituency or devoting time to legislating including committee work and 
oversight. The average percentage of time MPs devote to constituency work in 
the six countries is found in Figure 21. Again the percentage is highest in 
countries that elect the legislature from SMDs although Zambian MPs fall below 
                                                 
14
 For countries that elect their MPs from single member districts visiting the constituency 
means visiting the geographic area that elected the MP to office. For countries that elect the 
legislature via PR, the term “constituency” is more loosely interpreted to mean visiting 
regions of the country distant from the legislature, particularly rural areas.   In South Africa, 
the term is interpreted as the “shadow constituencies” to which MPs are assigned by their 
respective parties. 
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the average for these countries while South African MPs are above the average 
for countries that elect the legislature via PR. 

















Kenya Malawi Zambia Namibia Mozambique South Africa
Percent of Time
 
Two reasons explain why MP behavior falls significantly short of public 
expectations. The first are the multiple demands on legislators’ time. If MPs 
matched citizen demands to be present in their constituencies, especially in 
countries that elect the legislature from SMDs, they would have significantly 
time for legislating or oversight. Second and equally important is the cost of 
visiting one’s constituency or the area to which one has been assigned by one’s 
party in the case of South Africa. As indicated in Table 2, a visit back to the 
constituency is not without cost. In addition to the cost of travel, MPs are 
expected to spend a substantial amount of money on contributions to individual 
constituents (e.g. school fees, hospital bills, burial services) or on contributions 
to community development projects (e.g. schools, health clinics, water systems).   
However, how MPs actually allocate their expenditures between travel, 
contributions to individuals and contributions to development projects varies 
greatly from one country to the next.  As we obtain data for additional countries, 
ALP will seek to explain that drives these allocations in greater detail.  A review 
of Table 2, however, suggests that one variable is distance of travel to the 
constituency. The greater the distance, as in Mozambique, the greater percentage 
of the cost devoted to travel.  As for whether MPs contribute to individuals or to 
community development it would appear that the former accounts for two-thirds 
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to four-fifths of all contributions except in Kenya where there is a strong 
tradition and history of rural communities providing for their basic needs. 
Table 2: Cost and Allocation of Constituency Service
(Single Trip)
Kenya Malawi Zambia South Africa Namibia Mozambique
Travel to 
Constituency
49.5% 13.1% N/A N/A N/A 69.4%
Contributions-
Individuals




26.8% 29.0% N/A N/A N/A 4.8%
Total Cost 
(USD)
$2,741 $1,256 $2,527 N/A N/A $1,390
Members of Parliament often incur significant costs in constituency service.  What is your best estimate of 
each of the following? 
A. The average total travel cost (that is, travel, lodging, food) incurred in a single trip between your 
constituency and Cape Town? (that is, including any amounts that parliament pays for)?
B. The average contributions you personally make to individual constituents to help them with personal 
problems per month? 
C. The average contributions you personally make to local community development projects per month
(excluding [ Constituency Development Funds] )? 
 
Whatever the particular allocation of expenditures, the cost and time burden of 
visiting ones constituency is considered be a major or minor burden from 
between 72 to 85 per cent of the MPs interviewed in five of the six countries for 
which data is presently available as indicated in Figure 22 (next page). 
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Kenya Malawi Zambia Mozambique South Africa
Major Burden Minor Burden
How would you describe the burden on your personal time and financial costs of 
travelling back to your constituency? 
Figure 23 (next page) explores how MPs spend their time once in the 
constituency or, in the case of MPs in countries that elect their legislatures via 
PR, how they spend their time when visiting areas distant from the legislature.  
Here again the pattern differs depending on the type of electoral system 
employed.  In countries that elect their MPs from SMDs, MPs devote the largest 
proportion of their time to interacting with constituents via meeting and groups, 
that is to say, via organized forums. The second most important activity is 
simply “listening to constituents,” a perspective that is consistent with citizens’ 
expectations as presented back in Figure 1 (page 7) that MPs should focus first 
on representing their views.  Spending time on “party work” requires little or no 
time of MPs in Kenya, Malawi or Zambia, but is very important in the three 
countries that elect the legislature via PR.  Time spent on party work also seems 
to crowd out time spent on meetings and other organized forums which suggests 
that it is most likely the party that organizes such forums in these countries.  
While some MPs do spend time inspecting development projects it does not 




                                                 
15
 The low figures given to “inspecting development projects” is somewhat surprising given 
the expectation that MPs devote time to promoting development in their districts.   The low 
response may be an artifact of the wording of the question.   We will explore this issue further 
in a later paper devoted solely to constituency service. 
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Kenya Malawi Zambia Namibia Mozambique South Africa
Talk to Meetings & Groups Listen to Constituents Party Work Inspect Dev Projects
How do you spend most of your time when you are in your constituency?
























Kenya Malawi Zambia Namibia Mozambique South Africa
Has Rep While Not In Const Has Office Office Helps Constituency Relations
Do you have someone who represents you when you are not in your constituency ?  Do you have a 
constituency office?  Regardless of whether you have an office or not, does having an office in your 




We conclude this discussion of constituency service by reviewing the efforts 
MPs are making to maintain a presence in their constituencies when they are 
away in the legislature. As presented in Figure 24, MPs are now making 
considerable effort in some countries to have a representative back in the district 
when he or she are not there and to maintain an office to deal with constituency 
relations. This is a major step forward compared to the situation of only a 
decade ago when maintaining such staff or offices was rare.  Three additional 
findings are present in the data.  First, that Kenya, the legislatures with some of 
the greatest resources in terms of salaries and travel allowances for members and 
an extensive staff complement leads the way in facilitating an extensive MP 
presence at the constituency level.  Put simply, resources count with respect to 
performing the function of constituency service and representation as much as 
they count with respect to performing the functions of legislating and oversight.  
Second, MPs in countries that elect their legislatures from SMDs perform higher 
than in countries that elect the legislature via PR.  Indeed, the data for Namibia 
and Mozambique underscore how poor such relations can become in PR 
systems. Whether or not the South African experiment of creating a shadow 
system of constituencies and providing resources for MPs to maintain a robust 
presence in their “assigned” constituency improves matter can only be answered 





As noted at the outset of this report of “first findings” from the African 
Legislatures Project, the conclusions presented herein are tentative and require 
at least two forms of follow-up analysis to confirm with confidence.  First, the 
data presented in this report is limited to five or six countries depending on the 
variable considered. Confirmation of the generalizations made to all six 
countries, or to different subgroups such as those that elect their legislatures 
from single member districts contrasted with those that use PR, requires more 
country cases. During the course of 2010 ALP will expand the dataset to include 
data for 14 countries. Depending on funding the ALP dataset will ultimately 
include data from 18 to 20 countries. As data for more countries come available, 
the generalizations advanced will become more robust.   
 
The conclusions advanced in this report have also been based solely on a 
selected analysis of “one way” frequency distributions across the six countries.  
That is to say, we have examined one variable at a time, and based this report on 
clusters of variables relevant for each section of the report. However, to fully 
explore the relationships suggested in this discussion it is necessary to do more 
than simply describe the basic findings for each country and explain why the 
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findings reported occur as they do.  This in turn requires a multivariate analysis 





Notwithstanding the limitations of this report, we can summarize its major 
conclusions that flow from our findings as follows: 
 
1. As expected given the demographics and history of African countries, both 
citizens and MPs place a much higher emphasis on representation and 
constituency service than on legislating and oversight, two defining 
functions of the legislature. This poses a dilemma for MPs in most 
emerging legislatures—do they emphasize representation and constituency 
service with the result that the legislature of which they are members will 
not develop into a sufficiently powerful institution capable of holding the 
executive accountable to the public?  Or, do they devote more time to 
legislating and oversight at the risk of displeasing the electorate and 
suffering defeat when running for reelection? 
 
2. The form of electoral system via which a country selects its members of the 
legislature has a profound effect on the relationships between MPs and the 
public, the operations of the legislature, and the nature of legislative-
executive relations.  The form of electoral system also has profound effect 
on the nature and structure of African political parties and the relationship 
of MPs to their parties.  Put differently, there is much more at stake than 
simply translating votes into seats and whether that translation is 
“proportional.” 
 
3. The strength and internal cohesion of political parties and especially of the 
ruling party impacts greatly on the legislative process.  Further analysis, 
however, is required to fully understand the impact of political parties on 
the process of legislative development. 
 
4. Notwithstanding the historical weakness of African legislature and the 
emphasis placed on representation and constituency service, it is clear that 
some of these legislatures have made significant progress in recent years 
and are asserting their role in the political process. Viable albeit 
undeveloped committee systems are emerging within some of these 
legislatures. Bills introduced by the executive for passage by the legislature 
are no longer “rubber stamped” but increasingly scrutinized and often 
amended before being passed into law.  More extensive and effective 
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oversight of the executive also appears to be emerging in some countries 
though an examination of this function was not included in this report.  
Though limited in some countries, the involvement of civil society in the 
legislative process, especially in countries with large urban sectors, is also 
on the rise. 
 
5. The amount of resources provided to both MPs and to the institution 
impacts on legislative performance.  In countries such as Kenya and South 
Africa where MPs salaries and travel allowances are high, and where 
legislative committees are better staffed, the frequency and quality of both 
committee service and constituency service is higher than in countries such 
as Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia where the legislature is relatively 
under resourced.  Put differently, the viability of the legislature with respect 
to the performance of its defining functions is impacted by the availability 
of resources for the legislature and its members. This in turn begs the 
question of how and why sufficient resources are provided to the legislature 
in some countries but not in others. 
 
 
Implications for Legislative Strengthening 
 
Given the provisional nature of these findings we are also tentative in suggesting 
what these findings imply for donor agencies such as DfID that  
engage in legislative strengthening programs in selected countries. Some 
recommendations, however, flow from the summary above: 
 
1. More attention needs to be paid, both generally and in countries where 
donors have or are contemplating legislative strengthening programs, to the 
form of electoral system and its impact on the political process.  Electoral 
system design is generally an area neglected by the donor community or 
considered only when engaging in election support.  The choice of electoral 
system, however, impacts on the legislative process and must be taken into 
account. 
 
2. Donor efforts devoted to strengthening the development of the committee 
system are well placed, especially where efforts are being made to establish 
an appropriate number of sectoral or portfolio committees that shadow 
MDAs.   
  
3. Donor efforts to support civil society should perhaps devote greater 
attention to raising civil society engagement with the legislature, 
particularly with those committees relevant for individual CSOs.   
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4. Because resources count, and because some countries such as Kenya and 
South Africa have committed substantial resources to supporting the 
operations of their legislatures including travel support for MPs to their 
constituencies, donors should be careful when considering any provision of 
funds to support legislative operations. The sustainability of reforms that 
build capacity within the legislature and between the legislature and the 
public are, in the final analysis, dependent on the willingness by political 
elites to provide necessary resources.  Donors should therefore concentrate 
on sharing best practice via the provision of technical assistance to the 
extent that such assistance is requested by key leaders in the legislature, 
e.g. the Speaker, the clerk, heads of party caucuses, etc. 
 
5. Above all else, donors must recognize that building capacity within 
emerging legislatures takes time. Today’s legislatures in Africa are very 
different from those of a decade or a decade and a half ago, but the changes 
observable within these bodies have been slow in emerging and did not 
occur overnight.  Building legislative capacity is also invariably a “messy” 
process that is part of a larger political process. Donors seeking to build 
legislative capacity should do so only when and where they are committed 
to a sustained effort over a sustained period of time, and where they are 
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